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Abstract 
 
The  current definitions of systems of innovation (SI), which define SI in institutional 
terms only, do not resolve the key bottleneck in conceptualising this notion. The 
paper  develops  a  conceptual  framework  which  enables  more  structured 
understanding  of  SI  based  on  four  building  blocks:  technological  regime, 
institutional set-up and market and pre-market selection environments. This allows 
SI to be defined as a co-evolution of technological regimes and institutional set up 
moulded through mechanisms of market and pre-market selection. 
 
                                                 
1This paper is one of the outcomes of my participation within  the international research network on 
systems  of innovation. Discussion on 3 workshops in Vadstena and Soderkoping (Sweden) and 
Lanzarote (Canary Islands), based on the chapters of the forthcoming book (Edquist et al), 
contributed to much of my thinking on these issues. I am highly indebted to the members of the 
research network for stimulating discussions. Technology in Society 20 (1998) 75-86 
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Introduction 
 
  Systems of innovation (SI) has become a widely accepted concept in 
innovation studies for two reasons. First, it is an attempt to go beyond R&D in 
explaining innovation dynamics. The SI concept assumes that the rate of technical 
change does not depend only on the scale of different countries' R&D but also on 
inter-organisational learning processes. Second, these  processes are very much 
influenced by the institutional set-ups which foster competition and co-ordination. 
The notion does not encompass only stock of knowledge (R&D stock or technology 
capital) but also institutional elements which are strongly influencing growth 
dynamics. This is an important potential advantage of the SI perspective, especially 
in relation to new growth theory where flow is just a time derivative of stock of 
knowledge. SI should potentially better explain how technical opportunities convert 
into economic growth. 
  While being a promising line of research it seems that at the same time this 
research program entered into a phase of diminishing returns, at least temporarily. 
Empirical research done under this heading has not resulted in more theoretical 
insights while theoretical research seems to have got stacked  into the all 
encompassing notion  of institutions. Two problems in particular seem to indicate 
this state, first, the problem of systems boundaries, and second, an enormous 
institutional diversity of SI. 
 
 
Boundaries of SI 
 
Even from the very beginning of research in this area there were strong reservations 
regarding the boundaries, particularly national, of SI2. Especially the notion of NSI 
is a loose one and not sufficiently specified. Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1993) 
introduced the notion of technological system (TS) which imply that the boundaries 
of TS are indeterminate, meaning that these systems could be local, global or 
national. Indeed, a current agreement seems to be that systems boundaries are 
indeterminate (see Edquist et al, forthcoming). However, this has not solved the 
problem of what determines system boundaries. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2See Nelson (1993) and Lundvall (1992) introductory chapters. Technology in Society 20 (1998) 75-86 
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Institutional variety 
 
  The second problem in understanding SI is that it is defined only in 
institutional terms. (See an overview of seven definitions in the footnotes 3 and 4)3. 
Even the definitions of technological system (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991), and 
sectoral SI (Breschi and Malerba, 1995), which should have a clear reference to the 
specific characteristics of different TS or TR are also defined only in institutional 
terms4.  
  This highlighta two problems: first, what are institutions and, second, which 
institutions are relevant in explaining SI. In this paper we will leave aside the first 
problem as it would further complicate our main argument. However, the second 
problem, which institutions do matter for SI, should be discussed as it tackles the 
problem of definition of SI. 
  A solution for resolving an enormous institutional complexity has been 
solved so far by the opportunistic strategy of sticking mainly to the notion of 
organisations (enterprises, universities, other R&D institutions) and avoiding 
                                                 
3Freeman (1987), who first coined the term NSI, defines it as: the network of institutions in the public 
and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new 
technologies may be described as the 'national system of innovation. 
 
Nelson (1993) does not have one clear cut definition of NSI.  (NSI is) a set of institutional actors 
that, together, plays the major role in influencing innovative performance. (This is)not limited to (...) 
firms at the forefront of world's technology, or to institutions doing the most advanced scientific 
research (but on) the factors influencing national technological capabilities. .... (Thus, there is) no 
sharp guide to just what should be included in the innovation system, and what can be left out.  
 
Niosi et al  (1993) define NSI as the system of interacting private and public firms (either large or 
small), universities, and government agencies aiming at the production if S&T within national 
borders. Interaction among these units may be technical, commercial, legal, social, and financial, 
inasmuch as the goal of the interaction is the development, protection, financing, or regulation of 
new S&T. (p. 212) 
 
Lundvall et al (1992) make a distinction between a SI in the narrow sense and a SI in the broad sense. 
The narrow definition would include organisations and institutions involved in searching and 
exploring - such as R&D departments, technological institutes and universities. The broad definition 
(...) includes all parts and aspects of the economic structure and the institutional set-up affecting 
learning as well as searching and exploring - the production system, the marketing system and the 
system of finance present themselves as sub-system in which learning takes place (p.2). 
 
Patel and Pavitt (1994, p. 79) define NSI as the national institutions, their incentives structures and 
their competencies, that determine the rate and direction of technological learning (or the volume 
and composition of change-generating activities) in a country.  
 
4Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991) define technological system (as) a network of agents interacting in 
the economic and industrial area under  a particular institutional infrastructure and involved in the 
generation, diffusion, and utilisation of technology. Malerba and Breschi (1995) define sectoral 
systems of innovation (...) as the population of firms which are active in the innovative activities of a 
sector. Such firms are engaged in the generation and utilisation of new technologies and they are 
involved in process of interaction, co-operation, competition and selection. (p.1) 
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analysis of other types of institutions (legal, informal, patterns of behaviour). 
However, even from this perspective the institutional complexity of NSI is still 
analytically unmanageable (see Nelson, 1993). Without a common conceptual 
framework presentations of SI are never exhaustive as 15 case studies in Nelson 
(1993) show. As a result there is always temptation to add additional factors which 
could further explain the system not does adding more countries in descriptive 
analysis solve the problem.  
  Based on such understanding of the problem we try to develop here a 
conceptual framework for defining SI which might hopefully resolve some of the 
vagueness of the concept.  
 
 
1. Basic building blocks 
 
The basic building blocks of our SI framework are shaped by the structuring forces 
and mechanisms of selection. Structuring forces are technological regime and 
institutional set-up. Mechanisms of selection, which ensure the dynamics of SI, are 
pre-market and market selection mechanisms. 
 
Technological regime (TR) 
TR as a concept is developed by Malerba and Breschi (1995). TR is defined by the 
level and type of opportunity and appropriability conditions, by the cumulativeness 
of technological knowledge and by the nature of knowledge and the means of 
knowledge transmission and communications (p. 3). TR is basically a technological 
trajectory but defined multidimensionally. (See table below).  
 
 
Relevant dimensions of technological regimes (TR) 
Opportunity  Appropriability  Cumulativeness  Knowledge Base 
Level  Level  Technology  Generic/Specific 
Pervasiveness  Means  Firm  Tacit/Codified 
Variety    Sector  Simple/Complex 
Source    Area  Independent/System 
Source: Breschi and Malerba (1995) 
 Technology in Society 20 (1998) 75-86 
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  Different dimensions of TRs are basically sub-building blocks by whose 
recombination is possible to get different sectoral SI whose boundaries are 
determinate5.   
   Specific properties of TRs crucially affect the organisation of innovative 
activities and the dynamics in the population of innovators across different sectors. 
In that respect they set the boundaries of institutional diversity. For example, it 
would be impossible that the car industry today could be developed in hundreds of 
small shops as happened at the beginning of this century. Current TR of this sector 
puts clear boundaries to institutional diversity in organising its innovative activities. 
  An objection to the notion of TR is that it abstracts from institutional set up 
Opportunities, appropriabilities, cumulativeness and knowledge base do not come as 
manna from heaven but are themselves the product of institutional development 
also. The answer is that institutions are embedded to some extent in the very notion 
of TR (Malerba and Breschi, 1995, p. 4) to a degree that they are now 'hard' facts 
and hence can be characterised as technological. However, that does not solve the 
problem of institutional differences based on the same TR. The same sector can be 
organised in different countries in different ways and yet be very similar in terms of 
TR dimensions. Whether these institutional differences are then relevant or not will 
be discussed later. The point is that the notion of SI has not only to have explicit 
reference to TR but also to institutions. 
 
Institutional set-up 
 
  The core idea behind the SI research program is that differences in national 
or sectoral institutional set-ups, i.e. the way countries or sectors organise their 
innovative activities matter. Among NSI institutional differences are (Lundvall, 
1992) in the internal organisation of firms; interfirm relationships; the role of the 
public sector; the institutional set-up of the financial sector; and R&D intensity and 
R&D organisation. Descriptive studies of different NSI show a huge variety of 
institutional landscapes such that it is very difficult to decide which institutional 
                                                 
5On this basis Malerba and Breschi (1995) distinguish five patterns or sectoral SI:  
1. Traditional sectors such as shoes and textiles: many innovators, geographically dispersed with no 
specific knowledge spatial boundaries 
2. Mechanical industries and the industrial district: many innovators, geographically concentrated 
with local knowledge boundaries 
3. The car industry: few innovators, geographically concentrated with local knowledge boundaries 
4. The computer mainframe industry: few innovators, geographically concentrated with (internal) and 
global knowledge boundaries 
5. Software, the modern electronics industry and Silicon Valley: many innovators, geographically 
concentrated with both local and  global knowledge boundaries. 
 Technology in Society 20 (1998) 75-86 
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differences are 'noise' and which are relevant or explanatory. Institutional 
development cannot be understood outside specific historical and country or sector 
contexts, which poses huge problems for comparative work. Indeed, our 
understanding of the role of institutional set up in innovation dynamics significantly 
improves when the whole context of path dependency or historical origin, functions 
and built in incentives are taken into account. We may temporarily conclude that the 
historical institutional analysis is the most appropriate way to analyse the link 
between institutional set up and innovation dynamics.    
  However, firstly, historical institutional analysis has low predictive power, 
and, secondly, it is very difficult to generate much theoretical insight from it as 
specificity of particular historical moment is often not transferable to other contexts. 
Obviously we need greater theoretical understanding of how institutional set ups 
influence innovation dynamics.  
  The task is to link particular institutional structures to paths of technological 
development or to understand which technology patterns can be accounted for by 
institutional variations. As Zysman (1993) rightly points out the notion of SI should 
specify how the 'system' drives innovation trajectories6.  On the other hand 
innovation trajectories are not entirely plastic, i.e. shaped by the institutional set-
ups. They are structured significantly  by the current levels of S&T which 
subsequently shape institutional set-ups. The complexity of SI as a notion arises 
from an interplay of technological trajectories and institutional set ups.  Institutions 
define the SI but only through their co-evolution with technological trajectories and 
TR.  
 
  By now we have two building blocks of our framework, TR and institutional 
set-up. Basically they are not something new in the area of innovation theories (See 
Rosenberg, 1976, 1982; Freeman and and Perez, 1988). What is new is the notion of 
technological regimes which enables us to be more specific in conceptualising the 
link between technology and institutional set up as structuring forces of SI. Pre-
market and market selection mechanisms are the two following elements which give 
dynamics to our framework. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6Zysman (1993) himself finds the way out in 'historical institutional analytical strategy' of research. 
We find this approach very costly and with low theoretical value. While it generates a wealth of 
insights at the same time it requires voluminous descriptive analysis and it has low theoretical value. 
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Pre-market selection 
 
  Pre-market selection mechanisms operate chiefly within the firm (like 
business strategy) and within the bureaucratic and legal structures (e.g. R&D 
funding, patent laws)7. In the creation of SI processes of pre-market selection are 
very important as the cases analysed in Carlsson and Jacobsson (1995) confirm. 
However, SI are ultimately shaped through an interplay of pre-market and market 
selection mechanisms. They are mixtures of public and private actors whose joint 
interaction might produce either coherent or fragile institutional constellations. 
 
 
 
Market selection 
 
  Market selection is the ultimate criterion of viability of new technologies. 
While pre-market selection generates much higher technological variety the market 
selection reproduces only economically relevant variety which is narrower in scope. 
 
  These four building blocks constitute our conceptual model of SI. The 
proposition is that SIs are constituted through coupling between TRs and 
institutional set-ups where different selection environments give dynamics to the 
system. How these four building blocks are interrelated can be seen from the table 
below. 
 
   
                                                 
7New technologies, especially simulation modelling and techniques, have moved the boundaries of 
pre-market selection much more inside the firm, due to the spread of virtual experimentation and 
simulation techniques which avoid costs of trial and errors through market experimentation 
(Stankiewicz, 1995). Technology in Society 20 (1998) 75-86 
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 Structuring forces of Innovation Systems and mechanisms of selections 
 
 
 
 
 
Field IV 
Pre-market 
selection 
(intra-firm procedures, 
patents, R&D funding) 
 
 
 
 
Field I 
Technological regime as 
a structuring force 
  Institutional set-up as a 
structuring force 
 
 
Field III 
Market selection 
mechanisms 
(price, demand, market 
power) 
 
 
Field II 
 
 
  While elements of our framework do not by themselves seem to be anything 
new their mutual relationships offer interesting insights for a more theoretical 
understanding of the SI concept. Two structuring forces and two mechanisms of 
selection produce four fields of interaction. These four fields represent different 
aspects of SI. While both structuring forces and mechanisms of selection are present 
in all SI different systems are skewed towards different fields. Mutual interaction in 
four factors of our framework is enough general to encompass different 
configurations of SI. 
 
 
Field I: Forms of knowledge products are plastic 
 
  In this field institutional set up gives boundaries of pre-market selection 
while pre-market selection may modify institutional set up. For example current 
funding institutions and their rules limit the possibilities for changing priorities. A 
weak patent system rooted in corresponding laws and institutions for monitoring 
property rights will not stimulate firms to search for patentable products. On the 
other hand very strong and priority driven funding will gradually create an entirely 
new institutional landscape which will eventually lead to new bunch of R&D results 
to be later tested through market selection. Tight patent laws which will eventually 
be supported by an institutional set up (a patent office, patent centres) will lead to 
more patenting of innovations.  Technology in Society 20 (1998) 75-86 
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  The point is that different institutional characteristics, like the degree of 
codification, completeness of disclosure, ownership status, play a crucial role in 
shaping the character of R&D (knowledge products) (David and Foray, 1995) 8. The 
main proposition developed by David and Foray (1994, 1995) is that these, basically 
institutional characteristics, are not inherent in the knowledge itself but are the 
product of social organisation and of the attendant reward structures of those 
institutions supporting the production of knowledge. As a result, knowledge 
products are very plastic, i.e. they are to a significant extent shaped by the social 
characteristics of knowledge production9. Although  Foray (1995) puts reservations 
on this strong proposition it well illustrates the basic perspective10.  
  From the perspective of our framework we put strong reservations on how 
general is this aspect of SI. While it can quite well be applied to the science and 
R&D spheres, i.e. to areas where pre-market selection is the dominant selection 
mechanism it is not applicable to the classes of SI where market selection is the 
dominant mechanism. Indeed, many of examples that David and Foray exploit to 
support their proposition on the institutional plasticity of knowledge products are 
from science and not from the technology area. 
 
 
Field II: Organisational regime as a criteria of market selection 
 
  In this field institutional set up gives criteria and thus boundaries for market 
selection while market selection represents the main test for (mis)matching or 
viability of different enterprise and inter enterprise institutional arrangements. For 
example, network type of firms is seen as conducive for sectors with flexible 
specialisation production regimes. Those countries that are unable to develop such 
                                                 
8Any knowledge product could be positioned with respect to these (three) four dimensions. 
9This basic proposition enabled David and Foray (1995) to develop the proposition that systems that 
strongly support distribution of knowledge and which are thus based on a rather different set of 
incentive structures have distinctively different innovative dynamics and patterns. The flow of 
knowledge in 'knowledge distribution oriented systems'  generates opportunities for innovation. 
Hence it is not only the flow of innovation which generates knowledge but also the system which 
fosters knowledge distribution or exchange. Although extremely interesting this proposition is 
beyond our concerns here. 
 
10Foray (1995) puts it this way: However, there is not any exact, deterministic association between a 
given institutional context for research activities and the form that a knowledge-product will take. 
Rather, institutions and organisations, and the norms governing the actions of their members, 
possess a measure of elasticity, or 'suppleness', that permits the knowledge-products that they cater 
for to be expressed in some range of forms - scientific papers in professional journals, patents, 
presentations at open conferences, shared expertise, confidential memoranda - depending upon the 
range of incentives and institutional compromises among conflicting goals. (p. 5) 
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organisational forms are supposed to lag in terms of dynamic growth.  The basic 
idea, which is in the context of SI developed and tested by Guerrieri and Tylecote 
(1995), is that there are some fundamental behavioural requirements for successful 
innovation and for dynamic SI11. Specific organisational dimensions of the system 
(firm organisation and its relations with infrastructure) are the main criteria of 
market selection. It is the robust organisational regime around which market 
selection evolves. Market selection rejects those SI whose organisational regime 
does not match the specific robust institutional set up conducive to innovation 
dynamics. Much of the managerial literature is based on an implicit claim that it is 
able to recognise those organisational systems which are able to assimilate 
technological change and withstand market selection. 
  The spread of Japanese management techniques around the globe shows that 
an organisational regime like Toyotism  has wider inter-industry applicability. 
Matching of a specific country's organisational styles to this 'robust design' serve as 
a criterion of market selection. 
 
 
Field III: Technological regime as  a criteria of market selection 
 
  In this field technological regime is formed and it represents the main criteria 
for  market selection. Enterprises and related networks (in other words, SI) which do 
not fit with the dominant characteristics of  TR have low chances of survival.  TR, 
through technological opportunities, appropriability regime, level of cumulativeness 
and the character of knowledge base,  determine the shape of SI, including its spatial 
boundaries. Analyses of relevant dimensions of TR find strong similarities across 
countries in the ranking of sectors according to various measures of TR (particularly 
for opportunity and appropriability) even though in absolute terms sectors differ 
from one country to another with respect to the same measures (Malerba and 
Orsenigo, 1990; Breschi and Malerba, 1995). 
                                                 
11In the particular case behavioural requirements for technological advantage are dominantly micro 
(enterprise level). These are: functional (among the different functions and departments within the 
firm), vertical (up and down of command and among the different levels of management), and 
external (with other organisations). Beside these there are external requirements for technological 
advantage (science base, technically-trained manpower, financial system). On that basis trade and 
technological (patents) performance of countries can be explained by the degree of 'fit' between the 
'behaviour' and 'external' requirements of specific industries and 'sub-families', and the extent to 
which countries meet these requirements (Guerrieri and Tylecote, 1995). 
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  TR imply that technological imperatives are strong and determining factors 
for market selection. However, further more detailed empirical work would 
probably show differences in TRs in the same sectors across different countries12.  
  This field neglects areas where pre-market selection is the dominant 
selection mechanism which opens possibilities for different organisational 
arrangements. However, this field is highly relevant for many SIs and especially 
those where technology is largely embodied in hardware or is standardised. 
 
 
Field IV: Pre-market selection as a modifier or generator of TR/ TR and 
boundaries of pre-market selection 
 
  Current technological regimes (TR) determine boundaries of  pre-market 
selection. For example, public R&D funding priorities (pre-market selection) are to 
a great extent determined by R&D areas of enterprises which are mainly within the 
current technological trajectories and TRs. On the other hand, pre-market selection 
may change technological regime or create new ones, as in the case of many military 
related technological areas. A good example of this is the nuclear industry, which 
was a spin-off from military programs and has reached the level where one can talk 
about specific nuclear industry SI with their very specific technological regime.  
  Whether pre-market selection mechanisms can create new technological 
trajectories and TRs is to a great extent determined by the prevailing socio-
institutional context. For example, pre-market selection mechanisms are not strong 
enough to create push in the direction of faster technological development of a 
welfare complex, as opposed to military complex, which then might create 
distinctively new TRs. 
   At pre-market selection level institutional set up is much more important as a 
selection mechanism.  Pre-market selection can strongly influence TR and, thus, to a 
great extent shape the market selection process. For example, national security 
concerns are very powerful pre-market selection mechanism (Nelson, 1993). 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12Big methodological problems are caused by the unavailability of patent and other data at sub-
sectoral levels. The assumption that TR work at the desegregation level of  50 technological classes, 
which is the level used in the Malerba et al papers, is more a convenience caused by the lack of data 
than a theoretical proposition. Technology in Society 20 (1998) 75-86 
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Corollaries 
 
  From this framework four corollaries follow: 
 
Corr 1. SI should be defined not only in institutional terms but also in technological 
  terms or more specifically in terms of technological regimes. Our basic 
  proposition is it is the coevolution of institutions and technological regimes 
  which gives coherence and dynamics to SI.  
 
Corr 2. TR is a structuring force which provides boundaries of institutional 
  diversity. Only those institutional differences which influence and shape TR 
  are relevant from an SI perspective.  
 
  This (at least theoretically, if not practically) solves the problem of  
institutional noise (irrelevant institutional diversity) and compensatory institutions13. 
In that context the notion of NSI is methodologically sound only if we are able to 
show that different TRs within a country contain certain common traits. For 
example, we would have to show that TRs across Danish niche productions, which 
are most often in slow growth industries, have some common traits which represent 
distinct national meta-technological regime14. 
 
Corr 3. Institutional set up may influence TRs and organisational regimes.  This is 
  especially true in the pre-market selection phase where institutions play a 
  much more important role in the dynamics of some SI (fields I and IV). 
 
The discussion on variety within the SI context still suffers from vagueness and it 
still does not clearly address the problem - variety of what? Outputs, technologies, 
institutional forms? How these varieties relate to each other? Our framework 
enables us to distinguish between variety induced by pre-market or market selection 
mechanisms as well as between variety in organisational regimes vs. variety in 
                                                 
13By this we mean that many institutional forms can be used to perform basically the same or similar 
functions and the same functions can be performed in different ways in different SIs. For example, 
risk capital was in the 1970s and 1980s, to a large extent, provided by venture capital firms in the 
USA and by the state in Sweden (Edquist, 1993, p12). Whether R&D is carried out within 
Universities or in independent public institutes is often, from the viewpoint of industry, irrelevant.  
Whether the same functions occur within public or private institutions can be also irrelevant from an 
innovative dynamics perspective. 
 
14The Danish case is used by Zysman (1993) to support the hypothesis on national technological 
trajectories. However, we think that the existing empirical evidence on national trajectories is  weak 
and insufficiently analytic.  Technology in Society 20 (1998) 75-86 
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technological regimes. Diversity of technologies in the pre-market phase is wider 
than in the market phase where the market selection process reduces these to several 
or one dominant design (Cohendet and Llerena, 1995). Linking varieties in different 
selection environments with forces that structure SI enables a more structured 
approach to the problem of variety.  
 
Corr 4. Different SI are those where interaction of institutional set-ups and TRs 
  produces a distinctively different techno-institutional configuration 
  (constellation). Varieties in institutional set-ups that do not produce effects 
in   terms of TRs are irrelevant. 
 
Towards conceptualising dynamics of SI 
 
  We have outlined a conceptual model of SI which sheds light on different 
dimensions of SI and which helps us to structure discussion on SI in more 
theoretical terms. So far, our discussion has been static, abstracting from the 
problem of the dynamics or transformation of SI. Here we will only put forward a 
few ideas on the possible dynamic implications of our framework.  
 
  The first element of dynamics in the conceptual model comes from an 
interplay of pre- and market selection mechanisms. How technology pushed through 
public funding in the end gets transformed into TR where market selection 
dominates? 
 
  Second, while we recognise that the very notion of SI goes beyond an 
individual firm it is the firm that is the main agent where transformation of 
technology into products takes place (Tunzelman, 1995). Pre-market selection 
mechanisms generated within individual enterprises may change some aspects of TR 
or even create a new technological regime. Consider IBM who created a TR of the 
mainframe computer sector or Microsoft who transformed the TR of the PC 
industry. Individual enterprise may basically redefine the rules of the game and thus 
reshape SI. On the other hand new organisational regimes, based on flexible 
specialisation are formed through the interaction of public - private institutions and 
their development in very local contexts, as the examples of Third Italy, Swiss Jura 
or German Baden Wurtenberg illustrate. 
 
  Third, the co-evolution of TR and institutional set-ups, which is mediated 
through mechanisms of market and pre-market selection, helps us to understand why Technology in Society 20 (1998) 75-86 
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SI are basically in permanent flux. Robust SI are characterised by the compatibility 
of TR and the related institutional set-up based on the joint working of pre-market 
and market selection mechanisms. Fragile or incoherent SI usually suffer from 
incompatibilities between TR and institutional set-up or the lack of complementarity 
between market and pre-market selection mechanisms. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
   The aim of this paper was to present elements for a more theoretical 
understanding of SI and not necessarily to come up with a final definition of SI. For 
such an ill structured issue the definition is less important than its building blocks. 
Nevertheless, our methodological discussion did generate a definition of SI which 
reflects the main traits of our conceptual model:  
  
SI is a relatively coherent configuration (constellation) of firms and related 
institutions and organisations involved in the generation and utilisation of new 
technologies based on common TR and shaped through mechanisms of market and 
pre-market selection. 
 
  We hope that the developed framework might be used as a piece of 
appreciative theorising on SI as it enables reference to historical and more empirical 
types of analysis as well as openining the way for formal or semi formal modelling 
exercises. 
 
   Technology in Society 20 (1998) 75-86 
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